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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal presents the question whether the policy of 
the Newark (N.J.) Police Department regarding the wearing 
of beards by officers violates the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment. Under that policy, which the District 
Court held to be unconstitutional, exemptions are made for 
medical reasons (typically because of a skin condition 
called pseudo folliculitis barbae), but the Department 
refuses to make exemptions for officers whose religious 
beliefs prohibit them from shaving their beards. Because 
the Department makes exemptions from its policy for 
secular reasons and has not offered any substantial 
justification for refusing to provide similar treatment for 
officers who are required to wear beards for religious 
reasons, we conclude that the Department's policy violates 
the First Amendment. Accordingly, we affirm the District 
Court's order permanently enjoining the Department from 
disciplining two Islamic officers who have refused to shave 
their beards for religious reasons. 
 
I 
 
Since 1971, male officers in the Newark Police 
Department have been subject to an internal order that 
requires them to shave their beards. In relevant part, the 
order provides: 
 
       Full beards, goatees or other growths of hair below the 
       lower lip, on the chin, or lower jaw bone area are 
       prohibited. 
 
App. at 94 (Special Order from the Chief of Police No. 71- 
15, p.2 ("Order 71-15")). The order permits officers to wear 
mustaches and sideburns, id., and it allows exemptions 
from the "no-beard" rule for undercover officers whose 
"assignments or duties permit a departure from the 
requirements." Id. at 93. See Appellees' Br. at 14; Reply Br. 
at 9. 
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Officers Faruq Abdul-Aziz and Shakoor Mustafa are both 
devout Sunni Muslims who assert that they believe that 
they are under a religious obligation to grow their beards. 
See App. at 9-10; Supp. App. 3-4. According to the affidavit 
of an imam, "it is an obligation for men who can grow a 
beard, to do so" and not to shave. Supp. App. at 3. The 
affidavit continues: 
 
       . . . The Quran commands the wearing of a beard 
       implicitly. The Sunnah is the detailed explanation of 
       the general injunctions contained in the Quran. The 
       Sunnah says in too many verses to recount [:]"Grow 
       the beard, trim the mustache." 
 
       . . . I teach as the Prophet Mohammed taught that 
       the Sunnah must be followed as well as the Quran. 
       This in the unequivocal teaching for the past 1,418 
       years, by the one billion living Sunni Muslims world 
       wide. 
 
       . . . The refusal by a Sunni Muslim male who can 
       grow a beard, to wear one is a major sin. I teach based 
       upon the way I was taught and it is understood in my 
       faith that the non-wearing of a beard by the male who 
       can, for any reason is as [serious] a sin as eating pork. 
 
       . . . This is not a discretionary instruction; it is a 
       commandment. A Sunni Muslim male will not be saved 
       from this major sin because of an instruction of 
       another, even an employer to shave his beard and the 
       penalties will be meted out by Allah. 
 
Supp. App. at 4. The defendants have not disputed the 
sincerity of the plaintiffs' beliefs.1  
 
When Aziz and Mustafa were questioned about their non- 
compliance with Order 71-15, they informed Department 
officials that they were growing their beards for religious 
reasons. See Supp. App. at 1 & 5. This explanation was 
apparently deemed inadequate, and Mustafa received a 
Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action in July 1996 
charging him with disobeying an oral command to comply 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Cf. Lewis v. Scott, 910 F.Supp. 282, 287 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (testimony 
of an Islamic chaplin regarding whether a beard is obligatory). 
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with Order 71-15. App. at 96-97. Aziz received a similar 
notice in January 1997. Id. at 98-99. In both cases, the 
notices informed the officers that their actions might 
warrant "removal" from the Department. Id. at 96 & 98. 
 
On January 24, 1997, Chief of Police Thomas C. O'Reilly 
announced a "Zero Tolerance" policy for officers who were 
not in compliance with Order 71-15 and had not received 
"medical clearance" to wear a beard. App. at 95 
(Memorandum from the Chief of Police No. 97-30 ("Memo 
97-30")). Consistent with this policy, the Department 
ordered Officers Aziz and Mustafa to appear for disciplinary 
hearing in May 1997. 
 
Prior to the hearing, Mustafa and Aziz filed a complaint 
in the District Court requesting permanent injunctive relief 
on the ground that the Department's enforcement of Order 
71-15 would violate their rights under the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment.2 After the defendants filed 
a motion to dismiss, and the plaintiffs filed a motion for 
summary judgment, the District Court held a hearing and 
concluded that the Department's application of Order 71-15 
to Mustafa and Aziz would violate their free exercise rights. 
Accordingly, the District Court permanently enjoined the 
defendants "from disciplining or otherwise disadvantaging 
Plaintiffs Aziz and Mustafa for violating Order 71-15 or any 
other directive which would require them to shave or trim 
their beards in violation of their religious beliefs." App. at 
23. 
 
II 
 
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which 
has been made applicable to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 303 (1940), provides that "Congress shall make 
no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. U.S. 
Const. amend. I. For many years, the Supreme Court 
appeared to interpret the free exercise clause as requiring 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Mustafa and Aziz brought several other claims, all of which were 
dismissed by the District Court. See App. at 15-16. The plaintiffs have 
not appealed these dismissals. 
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the government to make religious exemptions from neutral, 
generally applicable laws that have the incidental effect of 
substantially burdening religious conduct. See Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) ("[T]here are areas of 
conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to 
control, even under regulations of general applicability."); 
see also Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 
U.S. 829, 832-34 (1989); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana 
Employment Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717 (1981); Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-404 (1963). In these cases, the 
Court required the government to meet "strict scrutiny" 
when application of a given law or regulation served to 
impose a substantial burden on religious activity. See 
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718 ("The state may justify an inroad 
on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive 
means of achieving some compelling state interest."); Yoder, 
406 U.S. at 215 ("[O]nly those interests of the highest order 
and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate 
claims to the free exercise of religion."). 
 
In 1986, a plurality of the Court raised doubts about the 
breadth of the Court's "exemption" jurisprudence and 
proposed a new approach. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 
703-08 (1986) (Burger, C.J., joined by Rehnquist and 
Powell, J.J.). In Roy, a mother and father who wished to 
participate in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
program objected on religious grounds to the requirement 
that they furnish their daughter's Social Security number 
as a condition of receiving benefits. Id. at 695. Although the 
Court's precedent indicated that these circumstances were 
sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny because the government 
had "condition[ed] receipt of an important benefit upon 
conduct proscribed by a religious faith," Thomas, 450 U.S. 
at 717-718, the plurality opinion applied rational basis 
review. Roy, 476 U.S. at 707-08. The opinion explained: 
 
       We conclude . . . that government regulation that 
       indirectly and incidentally calls for a choice between 
       securing a governmental benefit and adherence to 
       religious beliefs is wholly different from governmental 
       action or legislation that criminalizes religiously 
       inspired activity or inescapably compels conduct that 
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       some find objectionable for religious reasons. Although 
       the denial of government benefits over religious 
       objection can raise serious Free Exercise problems, 
       these two very different forms of government action are 
       not governed by the same constitutional standard. 
 
Id. at 706 (emphasis added). See also id. at 704. 
 
In sum, the plurality proposed that the Court continue to 
apply heightened scrutiny to neutral, generally applicable 
laws that burden religious activity by affirmatively 
compelling or prohibiting conduct, but apply rational basis 
scrutiny to neutral, generally applicable rules governing 
benefits programs. However, rather than advocating the 
overruling of the Court's prior benefits-exemption cases, 
such as Sherbert and Thomas, the plurality distinguished 
those decisions on the ground that they concerned laws 
that already included "mechanism[s] for individualized 
exemptions." Roy, 476 U.S. at 708. The plurality explained 
that if "a state creates such a mechanism, its refusal to 
extend an exemption to an instance of religious hardship 
suggests a discriminatory intent," and it is"appropriate to 
require the State to demonstrate a compelling reason for 
denying the requested exemption." Id. Since the statutory 
framework at issue in Roy did not provide for individualized 
exemptions, the plurality did not believe that the Court's 
prior benefits decisions were controlling. 
 
The Roy plurality's attempt to distinguish the Court's 
previous decisions and apply rational basis review failed to 
garner a majority of the Court. See id. at 715-16 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part); id. at 728-32 (O'Connor, 
J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, J.J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); id. at 733 (White, J., 
dissenting). In 1990, however, the legal landscape changed 
dramatically when the Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith concerned two 
individuals who were denied state unemployment 
compensation benefits after being fired from their jobs for 
ingesting peyote, a controlled substance under Oregon law. 
Id. at 874. The individuals challenged the denial of benefits 
on the ground that they were entitled to religious 
exemptions since they had ingested peyote for sacramental 
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purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church. 
Declining to apply strict scrutiny, the Court concluded that 
"the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of 
the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of 
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes 
(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes)." Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quotations omitted). 
See also id. at 878 (explaining that"if prohibiting the 
exercise of religion" is "merely the incidental effect of a 
generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First 
Amendment has not been offended"). Accordingly, the Court 
held that Oregon could, consistent with the Free Exercise 
Clause, criminalize religious peyote use and deny 
unemployment compensation benefits to individuals whose 
job dismissals resulted from such use. Id. at 890. 
 
The Smith Court, however, did not overrule its prior free 
exercise decisions, but rather distinguished them. See 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-884.3 In this case, the plaintiffs 
contend that their Free Exercise claim is not governed by 
the generally applicable Smith rule but is instead governed 
by the Court's pre-Smith decisions. In this connection, the 
plaintiffs make three arguments. First, they contend that 
the Smith decision should be limited to cases involving 
criminal prohibitions. Second, they argue that the Smith 
analysis does not apply to government rules that, like the 
"no-beard" policy, already make secular exemptions for 
certain individuals. Finally, they maintain that the Smith 
rule does not bar their exemption claim because they are 
relying on both the Free Exercise Clause and the Free 
Speech Clause. The District Court accepted the plaintiffs' 
first argument, applied the Court's pre-Smith  
jurisprudence, and concluded that the Free Exercise Clause 
prohibits the Department from enforcing its "no-beard" 
policy against Aziz and Mustafa. While we disagree with the 
District Court's conclusion that Smith is limited to the 
criminal context, we believe that the plaintiffs are entitled 
to a religious exemption since the Department already 
makes secular exemptions. As a result, we need not reach 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See generally Note, James M. Oleske, Jr., Undue Burdens and the Free 
Exercise of Religion: Reworking a "Jurisprudence of Doubt", 85 Geo. L.J. 
751 (1997). 
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the plaintiffs' "hybrid" free speech/free exercise argument.4 
See generally Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-882 (distinguishing 
"hybrid" claims from free exercise claims). 
 
III 
 
A 
 
Aziz and Mustafa first contend that the Smith rule applies 
only to cases involving criminal prohibitions. Since this 
case concerns a non-criminal prohibition, Aziz and Mustafa 
argue that the Court's pre-Smith decisions govern and 
heightened scrutiny applies. This position, however, has 
already been rejected by our court. See Salvation Army v. 
Department of Community Affairs of New Jersey, 919 F.2d 
183, 194-96 (3d Cir. 1990). Salvation Army involved a claim 
by The Salvation Army ("TSA") that it was entitled to a 
religious exemption from the requirements of the New 
Jersey Rooming and Boarding House Act of 1979, N.J. Stat. 
Ann. S 55:13B-1 (West 1989), and the regulations 
promulgated thereunder. Salvation Army, 919 F.2d. at 185. 
Like Aziz and Mustafa, TSA argued that "the Court's 
holding in Smith was limited to free exercise challenges to 
neutral, generally applicable criminal statutes ." Id. at 194 
(emphasis in original). Our response was unequivocal: "We 
cannot accept this interpretation of Smith." Id. 
 
In addition to the analysis provided in Salvation Army, 
see 919 F.2d at 194-96, we believe there are two further 
reasons to conclude that Smith is not limited to cases 
involving criminal statutes. First, under a contrary reading 
of Smith, the Free Exercise Clause would not be implicated 
when the government prohibits religious conduct through 
generally applicable laws, Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79, but 
would be implicated when the government imposes a lesser 
burden on religion through a generally applicable civil 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We do note, however, that the plaintiffs failed to allege a free speech 
violation in their complaint, see App. at 83-92, and explicitly disavowed 
such a claim before the District Court. See App. at 58 (July 18, 1997 
Hearing) (counsel for plaintiffs) ("We can all agree that freedom of 
expression would not extend to the wearing of beards."). 
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regulation. This counter-intuitive interpretation of the First 
Amendment is undermined by the very language of the 
Smith opinion: 
 
       [I]f a state has prohibited through its criminal laws 
       certain kinds of religiously motivated conduct without 
       violating the First Amendment, it certainly follows that 
       it may impose the lesser burden of denying 
       unemployment compensation benefits to persons who 
       engage in that conduct. 
 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 875 (quotation omitted) (emphasis 
added). See also id. at 898-99 (opinion of O'Connor, J., 
joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J.) ("A 
neutral criminal law prohibiting conduct that a State may 
legitimately regulate is, if anything, more burdensome than 
a neutral civil statute placing legitimate conditions on the 
award of a state benefit."). 
 
Second, the Supreme Court's most recent 
characterization of Smith supports our holding in Salvation 
Army that Smith is not limited to the criminal context. In 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), the 
Supreme Court stated: 
 
       Smith held that neutral, generally applicable laws may 
       be applied to religious practices even when not 
       supported by a compelling governmental interest. 
 
Id. at 2161. Nowhere in its discussion of Smith did the 
Flores Court indicate that the Smith decision only applied to 
generally applicable criminal laws. In fact, the law at issue 
in Flores was a non-criminal landmark ordinance. See 
Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2160. If the plaintiffs are correct, and 
Smith does not apply to non-criminal provisions, there 
would have been no need for the Flores Court even to 
discuss Smith. However, the Flores Court did much more 
than to discuss Smith; it struck down the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, insofar as it applied to 
the states, for the very reason that it was inconsistent with 
Smith. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2171-72. In light of Flores, 
it is difficult to say that Smith has no application to cases 
involving non-criminal statutes. 
 
Because this court has already rejected the argument 
that Smith is limited to cases involving criminal statutes, 
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and because that rejection is amply supported by both the 
Smith opinion itself and recent Supreme Court case law, we 
cannot agree with the plaintiffs and the District Court that 
Smith is distinguishable on the ground that it concerned a 
criminal statute. 
 
B 
 
Aziz and Mustafa's second argument is that the 
Department's refusal to make religious exemptions from its 
no-beard policy should be reviewed under strict scrutiny 
because the Department makes secular exemptions to its 
policy. This contention rests on the following passage from 
Smith in which the Court explained why some of its earlier 
religious exemption cases had applied strict scrutiny: 
 
       The statutory conditions in Sherbert and Thomas 
       provided that a person was not eligible for 
       unemployment compensation benefits if, `without good 
       cause,' he had quit work or refused available work. The 
       `good cause' standard created a mechanism for 
       individualized exemptions. As the plurality pointed out 
       in Roy, our decisions in the unemployment cases stand 
       for the proposition that where the State has in place a 
       system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to 
       extend that system to cases of religious hardship 
       without compelling reason. 
 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (quotations, citations, and 
alterations omitted). 
 
The Court reiterated this understanding of its religious 
exemption jurisprudence, and applied it outside the 
unemployment compensation context, in Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
537-38 (1993). In Lukumi, the Court reviewed several 
municipal ordinances regulating the slaughter of animals, 
one of which prescribed punishments for "[w]hoever . . . 
unnecessarily . . . kills any animal." Id. at 537. The Court 
explained that this ordinance could not be applied to 
punish the ritual slaughter of animals by members of the 
Santeria religion when the ordinance was not applied to 
secular killings: 
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       [B]ecause [the ordinance] requires an evaluation of the 
       particular justification for the killing, this ordinance 
       represents a system of individualized governmental 
       assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct. As 
       we noted in Smith, in circumstances in which 
       individualized exemptions from a general requirement 
       are available, the government may not refuse to extend 
       that system to cases of "religious hardship" without 
       compelling reason. Respondent's application of the test 
       of necessity devalues religious reasons for killing by 
       judging them to be of lesser import than nonreligious 
       reasons. Thus religious practice is being singled out for 
       discriminatory treatment. 
 
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537-38 (emphasis added) (quotations 
and citations omitted).5 
 
Aziz and Mustafa contend that, since the Department 
provides medical -- but not religious -- exemptions from its 
"no-beard" policy,6 it has unconstitutionally devalued their 
religious reasons for wearing beards by judging them to be 
of lesser import than medical reasons. The Department, on 
the other hand, maintains that its distinction between 
medical exemptions and religious exemptions does not 
represent an impermissible value judgment because 
medical exemptions are made only so as to comply with the 
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. S 12101 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. See also Roy, 476 U.S. at 708 (plurality opinion): 
 
       If a state creates a mechanism [for exemptions], its refusal to 
extend 
       an exemption to an instance of religious hardship suggests a 
       discriminatory intent. Thus . . . to consider a religiously 
motivated 
       resignation to be "without good cause" tends to exhibit hostility, 
not 
       neutrality, towards religion. 
 
6. In their reply brief, the defendants argue for the first time that the 
District Court "incorrectly decided the City of Newark has a medical 
exception." Reply Br. at 14. We will not entertain this argument as it 
conflicts with the defendants' position both in the District Court and in 
their opening brief to this court. See Defendants' Answer P 3; Brief in 
Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 11; Appellants' Br. at 11. 
Moreover, we are at a loss to understand the defendants' new position 
given that Memo 97-30 clearly provides exemptions from the "Zero 
Tolerance" policy for those who "have received medical clearance." App. 
at 95. 
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(1994). See Brief in Support of the Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss at 11. While this argument initially appears 
persuasive, it ultimately cannot be sustained. 
 
It is true that the ADA requires employers to make 
"reasonable accommodations" for individuals with 
disabilities. 42 U.S.C. S 12111(b)(5)(A) (1994). However, Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 imposes an identical 
obligation on employers with respect to accommodating 
religion. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e(j) (1994). This parallel 
requirement undermines the Department's contention that 
it provides a medical exception, but not a religious 
exception, because it believes that "the law may require" a 
medical exception. Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss at 11. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the 
Department has clearly been put on notice of Title VII's 
religious accommodation requirements. See EEOC 
Determination Letter, Charge No. 171970408 (attached to 
Plaintiffs' Letter Brief in Response to Defendants' Cross 
Motion for Summary Judgment); App. at 83 (Plaintiffs' 
Complaint) (citing Title VII). In light of these circumstances, 
we cannot accept the Department's position that its 
differential treatment of medical exemptions and religious 
exemptions is premised on a good-faith belief that the 
former may be required by law while the latter are not. 
 
We also reject the argument that, because the medical 
exemption is not an "individualized exemption," the 
Smith/Lukumi rule does not apply. See App. at 19 (Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 12). While the Supreme Court did speak in terms of 
"individualized exemptions" in Smith and Lukumi, it is clear 
from those decisions that the Court's concern was the 
prospect of the government's deciding that secular 
motivations are more important than religious motivations. 
If anything, this concern is only further implicated when 
the government does not merely create a mechanism for 
individualized exemptions, but instead, actually creates a 
categorical exemption for individuals with a secular 
objection but not for individuals with a religious objection. 
See generally Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542 (1992) ("All laws are 
selective to some extent, but categories of selection are of 
paramount concern when a law has the incidental effect of 
burdening religious practice.) (emphasis added). Therefore, 
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we conclude that the Department's decision to provide 
medical exemptions while refusing religious exemptions is 
sufficiently suggestive of discriminatory intent so as to 
trigger heightened scrutiny under Smith and Lukumi. 
 
Contrary to the Department's contention, our decision to 
apply heightened scrutiny is entirely consistent with the 
result in Smith. In Smith, the Court upheld an Oregon law 
that prohibited the "knowing or intentional possession of a 
`controlled substance' unless the substance has been 
prescribed by a medical practitioner." Smith, 494 U.S. at 
874. The Department argues that, since the prescription 
exception did not prompt the Smith Court to apply 
heightened scrutiny to the Oregon law, we should not apply 
heightened scrutiny in the instant case based on the 
Department's allowance of medical exemptions. See 
Appellants' Br. at 8-9. This argument, however, overlooks a 
critical difference between the prescription exception in the 
Oregon law and the medical exemption in this case. 
 
The Department's decision to allow officers to wear 
beards for medical reasons undoubtably undermines the 
Department's interest in fostering a uniform appearance 
through its "no-beard" policy. By contrast, the prescription 
exception to Oregon's drug law does not necessarily 
undermine Oregon's interest in curbing the unregulated 
use of dangerous drugs. Rather, the prescription exception 
is more akin to the Department's undercover exception, 
which does not undermine the Department's interest in 
uniformity because undercover officers "obviously are not 
held out to the public as law enforcement person[nel]." 
Reply Br. at 9. The prescription exception and the 
undercover exception do not trigger heightened scrutiny 
because the Free Exercise Clause does not require the 
government to apply its laws to activities that it does not 
have an interest in preventing. However, the medical 
exemption raises concern because it indicates that the 
Department has made a value judgment that secular (i.e., 
medical) motivations for wearing a beard are important 
enough to overcome its general interest in uniformity but 
that religious motivations are not. As discussed above, 
when the government makes a value judgment in favor of 
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secular motivations, but not religious motivations, the 
government's actions must survive heightened scrutiny.7 
 
C 
 
The Department has not offered any interest in defense of 
its policy that is able to withstand any form of heightened 
scrutiny. The Department contends that it wants to convey 
the image of a " `monolithic, highly disciplined force' " and 
that "[u]niformity [of appearance] not only benefits the men 
and women that risk their lives on a daily basis, but offers 
the public a sense of security in having readily identifiable 
and trusted public servants." Appellant's Brief at 14 
(citation omitted). We will address separately all of the 
interests that we can discern in this passage. 
 
The Department hints that other officers and citizens 
might have difficulty identifying a bearded officer as a 
genuine Newark police officer and that this might 
undermine safety. But while safety is undoubtedly an 
interest of the greatest importance, the Department's 
partial no-beard policy is not tailored to serve that interest. 
Uniformed officers, whether bearded or clean-shaven, 
should be readily identifiable. Officers who wear plain 
clothes are not supposed to stand out to the same degree 
as uniformed officers, and in any event the Department 
permits such officers to wear beards for medical reasons. 
The Department does not contend that these medical 
exemptions pose a serious threat to the safety of the 
members of the force or to the general public, and there is 
no apparent reason why permitting officers to wear beards 
for religious reasons should create any greater difficulties in 
this regard. 
 
The Department also suggests that permitting officers to 
wear beards for religious reasons would undermine the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. While Smith and Lukumi speak in terms of strict scrutiny when 
discussing the requirements for making distinctions between religious 
and secular exemptions, see Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (requiring a 
"compelling reason"); Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537 (same), we will assume 
that an intermediate level of scrutiny applies since this case arose in 
the 
public employment context and since the Department's actions cannot 
survive even that level of scrutiny. 
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force's morale and esprit de corps. However, the 
Department has provided no legitimate explanation as to 
why the presence of officers who wear beards for medical 
reasons does not have this effect but the presence of 
officers who wear beards for religious reasons would. And 
the same is true with respect to the Department's 
suggestion that the presence of officers who wear beards for 
religious reasons would undermine public confidence in the 
force. We are at a loss to understand why religious 
exemptions threaten important city interests but medical 
exemptions do not. Conceivably, the Department may think 
that permitting officers to wear beards for religious reasons 
would present a greater threat to the sense of uniformity 
that it wishes to foster because the difference that this 
practice highlights -- namely, a difference in religious belief 
and practice -- is not superficial (like the presence of 
pseudo folliculitis barbae) and thus may cause divisions in 
the ranks and among the public. (There is no doubt that 
religious differences have been a cause of dissension 
throughout much of human history.) But if this is the 
Department's thinking -- and we emphasize that the 
Department has not spelled out this argument in so many 
words -- what it means is that Sunni Muslim officers who 
share the plaintiffs' religious beliefs are prohibited from 
wearing beards precisely for the purpose of obscuring the 
fact that they hold those beliefs and that they differ in this 
respect from most of the other members of the force. In 
other words, if this is the real reason for the distinction 
that is drawn between medical and religious exemptions, 
we have before us a policy the very purpose of which is to 
suppress manifestations of the religious diversity that the 
First Amendment safeguards. Before sanctioning such a 
policy, we would require a far more substantial showing 
than the Department has made in this case. We thus 
conclude that the Department's policy cannot survive any 
degree of heightened scrutiny and thus cannot be sustained.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We also reject the defendants' argument that the District Court erred 
in awarding some $12,000 in attorney's fees in favor of the plaintiffs. 
The 
defendants argue that this amount was unnecessary because the 
plaintiffs might have prevailed without federal court litigation had they 
pursued available administrative remedies. We conclude, however, that 
the District Court acted well within the proper bounds of its discretion 
in making the award that it did under the circumstances present here. 
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IV 
 
For the reasons set out above, we affirm the decision of 
the District Court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                17 
